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Abstract: W.E. Gladstone’s changing and inconsistent views on religious oaths and
established churches present an intriguing puzzle. This article compares and contrasts
his early and later stances on these topics with the purpose of evaluating the place of
practical judgments in his arguments. This exploration reveals that the prevailing
description of Gladstone’s views, which privileges the role practicality played in his
later support for a more liberal set of policies governing church–state relations, does
not explain the changes and inconsistencies in his position as well as does a descrip-
tion that emphasizes the changes and continuities in his fundamental philosophy. In
conclusion, connections are suggested between this explanation of Gladstone’s views
and theoretical considerations regarding the development of liberal freedoms.
Introduction
W.E. Gladstone’s changing and eclectic positions on issues of religious free-
dom mark the views of a politically active figure who moved from a con-
stricted stance to a mostly, but not completely, liberal outlook on church–state
relations. To examine questions concerning those views is to begin to under-
stand a person important to the complex development of religious freedom in
the Anglo-American world. In particular, how did Gladstone’s later justifica-
tions for removing religious oaths for public office differ from his earlier sup-
port of such oaths? And how could he have led the Parliamentary effort to
disestablish the Church of Ireland in the 1860s and then defended the estab-
lishment of the Church of England almost immediately thereafter?3
In addressing these and related questions, I focus on practical judgments.
What role did they play in Gladstone’s justifications of church–state policies?
Here I define ‘practical judgment’ as did Aristotle, as an act of ‘calculat[ing]
well with respect to some worthwhile end’.4 I pursue this course because an
initial reading of Gladstone seems to verify the centrality of practical consid-
erations to his later, more liberal stance. That is, he appears to have justified
an expanded realm of religious freedoms when he turned belatedly to a set of
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practical judgments that highlighted the dangers to church and state resulting
from their mutual ties. But I argue that while Gladstone’s practical judgments
were important, they played a dependent role in his discussions of religious
freedom, reflecting the changes, continuities and ambiguities of his under-
lying philosophical tenets rather than driving his normative approach. More
important to understanding the differences between the early and later Glad-
stone, as well as the complexities of his later positions, is his dualistic reli-
gious anthropology, his historicism and his acceptance of equal protection. I
conclude by underlining the importance of such philosophical views to an
understanding of Gladstone’s mixed and puzzling stance towards religious
freedom, and then discussing the theoretical implications of that finding for
the development of liberal freedoms.
Understanding Gladstone
Gladstone initially rejected all efforts to sever connections between the Brit-
ish state and the Churches of England and Ireland or to open the political sys-
tem to non-Protestant dissenters. He defended instead the Irish and Anglican
religious establishments, justified the exclusion of Jews and atheists from
office through religious oaths, and only grudgingly accepted Catholic Eman-
cipation. Explanations for why Gladstone later reversed himself on all but the
Anglican establishment usually hold that he came to embrace a practical ori-
entation that cancelled or softened his religious idealism. Analysts point to
Gladstone’s decision in 1843 to support Peel’s policy of providing permanent
government funding to the Irish Catholic seminary at Maynooth as the point at
which he departed from his original idealism in favour of a pragmatic poli-
tics.5
The most absolute characterization of this kind is in Morley’s biography of
Gladstone, where Morley argues that the practical experience Gladstone
gained in Peel’s cabinet moved him from idealism to a generally pragmatic
orientation on all issues and hence to a gradual, progressive attachment to lib-
erty.6 Since Morley’s time, scholars have followed his lead but qualified his
conclusions. Bebbington follows rather closely in arguing that the Maynooth
episode led Gladstone to realize that although his original stance defending a
5 He had earlier resigned from Peel’s cabinet over this question, citing his stated
opposition to multiple establishments. Note that this change removed him from the ranks
of those who opposed government support for multiple religious institutions in Ireland,
but it did not make him less of a supporter of the Irish established church.
6 John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (3 vols., New York, 1921),
Vol. I, pp. 270–81. For an assessment of Morley and other biographers, see Deryck
Schreuder, ‘The Making of Mr. Gladstone’s Posthumous Career: The Role of Morley
and Knaplund as “Monumental Masons”, 1903–27’, in The Gladstonian Turn of Mind:
Essays Presented to J.B. Conacher, ed. Bruce Kinzer (Toronto, 1985), pp. 197–243.
Schreuder agrees with Acton and others that Gladstone’s turn to liberalism was incom-
plete, ‘spasmodic’, dualistic, practical and influenced by political environments.
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churchly state was ‘the ideal position . . . in the conditions of the mid nine-
teenth century it was impracticable . . . Gladstone’s theory foundered on the
rock of religious pluralism’.7 In a similar vein, while Matthew acknowledges
Gladstone’s changed views on religious diversity, he argues that Gladstone
never abandoned in principle his idealist understanding of the relationship
between the state and religion. He asserts rather that Gladstone came to
regard that understanding as ‘impractical on specifically allied subjects’ and
searched for ways in which ‘aspects of it be made practical by other means’
through moral statesmanship in colonial affairs, trade and international rela-
tions.8 Ramm offers another version of this explanation, arguing that the
Maynooth episode was the beginning of Gladstone’s Aristotelian quest to use
practical reason to approximate his ideal.9
Vidler creates a different variant of this theme, arguing that Gladstone
eventually recognized the impracticality of his early ideas but failed to create
alternatives. Vidler paints Gladstone as pursuing a practical political career
by adopting but not internalizing the liberal spirit of his times, creating an
unacknowledged disjunction between his political practice and his idealistic
beliefs.10 Likewise, Helmstadter argues that Gladstone retained his basic
theory regarding church and state, yet with increasing experience of power
‘became more flexible, more pragmatic, more astutely unpredictable in
manoeuvre’.11 Schreuder holds that Gladstone made practical modifications
to his idealism while retaining a flexible role for the state in promoting moral
progress, thereby creating a method of ‘moral pragmatism’.12 Stansky, too,
argues that, after Maynooth, Gladstone ‘was now able to become a more
accommodating and practical politician’ while he continued to defend conser-
vative and liberal positions, including both fairness and the belief that ‘the
state was a moral force’.13 Parry pursues a different line, arguing that Glad-
stone departed from earlier positions on the basis of his anti-Erastian attempt
to defend the Church of England from dissenting members of Parliament who
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might abuse the state machinery governing the church.14 Butler similarly
argues that Parliamentary politics led to the practical breakdown of Glad-
stone’s idealist understanding, forcing him to reconstruct his views on a High
Church anti-Erastianism that emphasized freedom for the Church of England
and social justice for everyone.15
While these explanations are helpful, they do not satisfactorily account for
the differences between the positions Gladstone took earlier and later in his
career on the topics of disestablishment and religious disabilities, nor for the
complexity of his later position on disestablishment. The argument that Glad-
stone retained but did not act on his original views for practical reasons, the
assertion that he retained those views but pursued their realization by prag-
matic means, and the hypothesis that he completely abandoned those views
for a pragmatic approach all privilege the role of practical judgments in ways
that leave important questions unanswered. For example, if Gladstone’s early
work also had ‘utilitarian’ overtones, as Keble and Matthew argue,16 what are
we to make of this continuity if we explain Gladstone’s later changes only by
reference to a turn to practicality? In addition, why should a bare application
of practical reasoning lead him to support the admission of Jews and atheists
to Parliament or to agree to disestablish the Church of Ireland? Would they
not just as easily have brought him, as Morley says of others who pursued the
same goals of political stability and defence of the Anglican establishment, to
support the policies of exclusion and Irish establishment on the practical
grounds that innovations would be too disruptive?17 And how do we explain
Gladstone’s use of practical reasoning to support elements of religious free-
dom in light of his utilization of it to resist Anglican disestablishment? The
practical qualification of Gladstone’s idealism that Morley, Bebbington,
Matthew, Ramm and Helmstadter identify appears overdrawn, while the
disjunction Vidler discovers does not seem to exist. Butler and Parry mean-
while ground Gladstone’s allegiance to freedom on his anti-Erastianism,
but this explanation is vulnerable to a critique similar to those above. In
particular, if Gladstone supported religious freedom mainly because he
14 J.P. Parry, Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867–1875
(Cambridge, 1986), p. 159.
15 Perry Butler, Gladstone, Church, State and Tractarianism: A Study of his Reli-
gious Ideas and Attitudes, 1809–1859 (Oxford, 1982), pp. 104, 120, 130. John Kenyon
also emphasizes Gladstone’s anti-Erastianism and commitment to religious freedom, as
well as the influence of changing contexts and the need for stability. J. Kenyon, ‘Glad-
stone and the Anglican High Churchman’, in The Gladstonian Turn of Mind, ed. Kinzer,
pp. 43, 57.
16 Keble, as quoted in Butler, Gladstone, pp. 88–9; Matthew, ‘Introduction’, Vol. 3,
pp. xxvii–xxix.
17 He glosses the opposition to Irish disestablishment as arguing ‘the operation was
too gigantic in its bearings, too complex in the mass of its detail, to be practicable’.
Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Vol. II, pp. 257–9.
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feared the threats the state posed to the church, the logical extension of that
position is the disestablishment of the Church of England, a policy he never
endorsed. Finally, while Stansky and Schreuder may be right in asserting that
Gladstone’s later defence of Anglican establishment involved a persistent
belief in the state’s moral duties in tandem with a commitment to religious
freedom and fairness, their explanation for this dichotomy, which characterizes
his position as a combination of liberalism and atavism, or as a product of a
moral pragmatism, does not clearly specify the grounds for that combination.
I suggest that we best understand Gladstone’s policies by appreciating fully
the background set of understandings he employed to interpret events and
apply practical reasoning to the problems he perceived in church–state rela-
tions. This entails not only looking at Gladstone’s views during the 1840s and
1850s, but also beyond that timeframe to compare his original set of under-
standings to those he employed later in life. When we do, we find that a per-
suasive explanation of Gladstone’s shifts and inconsistencies refers to the
continuities and changes in the elements of the intellectual framework that
focused his practical judgments. In particular, that explanation pays close
attention to his retention of a dualistic religious anthropology (that is, his
description of humans requiring both the freedom to follow their individual
consciences and the teachings of the institutional church to direct their spiritu-
ality), his continued historicism, and his belated acceptance of a principle of
equal protection.
Gladstone’s Original Framework:
The State in its Relations with the Church
Gladstone’s early position was outlined in The State in its Relations with the
Church (SRC).18 There he founded his understanding of church–state rela-
tions on an organic, historical conception of the state. The state is an enlarged
person that gains its identity from history and its purpose from God. Given
this conception, Gladstone emphasized the advantages that accrue to the state
from its association with religion, arguing that while the church can shift for
itself, the state needs the church to inform its conscience.19
Gladstone grounded his argument on a variety of sources that constituted
for him the ‘universal sense of mankind’. These included Paley, Hooker and
Locke;20 scriptural sources; an ethical analysis of the ‘nature of the state’; a
consequentialist argument that religion is necessary for attaining the ‘higher
and lower’ ends of the state; and ‘induction’ — judgments derived from an
94 D.J. LORENZO
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examination of historical materials.21 Gladstone then gave these texts an
Aristotelian veneer, not only borrowing from Aristotle an understanding of
humanity’s social life, but also taking from him the overall philosophical
position of the Politics. Like Aristotle, Gladstone saw the purpose of political
philosophy as understanding how to adapt the concept of the state to the spe-
cific context in which we live.22 Gladstone engaged in this analysis by invok-
ing three contextualized conceptions of the relations between church and
state. First he established the ideal form of the relationship, which entailed
describing the state in its perfect form. Next he depicted the best possible state
given human nature. Finally he described church–state relations in contempo-
rary Britain, characterizing them as falling short of the best possible model,
yet sufficiently close to that arrangement to merit defence.
The Ideal and Best Possible States
In establishing the ideal set of relations between church and state, Gladstone
concentrated on the state. It is natural and historical, he argued, not the artifi-
cial product of calculations and compact that Locke depicted. Along with
other natural entities like the family and the individual, the state has a ‘person-
ality’, a ‘conscience’ and potentially a ‘moral agency’. As such it needs ‘a
deliberative regulatory principle’, which, in order to conform to God’s laws,
‘requires the application to it of a conservatory principle of religion’. As a
‘living, active, and moral’ entity, the state has ‘religious responsibilities’ in
addition to those of preserving life and property.23 Thus he argued that the
state is and should be a moral agent, contrary to Locke’s understanding of a
government restricted to outer, secular projects.24 This ideal state in Glad-
stone’s conception is in perfect harmony with the moral and religious beliefs
of its citizens. All its citizens accept the state as part of their higher, organic
selves, and all citizens are members of an established church that provides the
state with its religious conscience. In contrast, he deemed a state that supports
a diversity of churches a conventional rather than a natural state, while label-
ling a state that completely severs its relations with religion as incomplete and
an Erastian state a tyranny.25
However, Gladstone acknowledged that an ideal state of this type is not
attainable. ‘The absolute and strictly ideal perfection of this theory . . .’, he
asserted, ‘requires conditions that have never been fully realized in our fallen
state, that is to say, not only unity of religious action in the state, but unity of
21 SRC, I, pp. 36–7.
22 See Ramm, William Ewart Gladstone, pp. 10–11, and Helmstadter, ‘Conscience
and Politics’, pp. 9–17.
23 SRC, I, pp. 45–6, 63–8.
24 Ibid., pp. 160–1.
25 Ibid., p. 302.
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personal composition with respect to religious profession . . .’.26 Given the
inescapable existence of religious diversity, we are left with the best possible
state as the practical summit of our expectations. This state also supports a
national church and defines its relationship with that church as one of full
‘unity of religious action’, but it nevertheless tolerates an inevitable contin-
gent of religious dissenters.27 Thus both a full identification between church
and state and religious toleration are its hallmarks.
Why should the best possible state continue to assume a full identification
with one church in a situation marked by religious diversity? Why not do away
with all connections or support all religions equally? Gladstone answered this
objection with a mix of moral, practical and historical references. Morally, as
Schreuder emphasizes, Gladstone argued that maintaining ties with the true
church is a state duty (just as it is a moral duty for the individual), and he
detected that true church in the Church of England.28 What is more, a series of
practical reasons established for Gladstone the importance of a close connec-
tion between the state and religion in general. With regard to the needs of even
a limited ‘Lockean’ government, he pointed to the prevention of crime — the
‘terrors of posthumous punishment’ are useful to deterring individuals from
breaking the law. A national religion also teaches the individual beneficial
material lessons involving thrift, productivity and the family. It makes indi-
viduals good people and citizens by ‘destroying that law of self-will and
self-worship’. And a national religion encourages obedience to laws and
‘contentment’ with the rights assigned by the constitution.29
Why a single established church rather than support for all denominations
given the multiplicity of churches and problems with detecting the true
church? Gladstone here turned to practicality and history. He argued on prac-
tical grounds that multiple establishments confuse people and make officials
appear hypocritical by supporting churches not their own. Likewise practical-
ity supports the stable connection with one church. A single, stable connec-
tion, Gladstone argued, reinforces the popular view that the church possesses
a true doctrine, for stability is associated with truth while change is associated
with doubt or error. It also promotes the self-government of the established
church and creates a defence against Erastianism. Meanwhile he argued that
multiple establishments are politically unstable. He pointed to Prussia and
New England as negative examples in this regard and provided a list of
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possible practical reasons for the failure of the New England experiment in
multiple establishments.30
Gladstone also cited historical evidence to the effect that all nations adopt a
singular national religion. Religious establishment follows national character,
as the histories of the Jews, Romans and Christians all attest. The United
States was no exception, he argued, pointing to the religious ceremonies that
marked the workings of the federal government. But Gladstone contended
that the American brand of official Christianity without establishment was an
extremely precarious and unsatisfactory arrangement. Those who did not want
government-sponsored religion were offended by official displays, forcing
those displays to be theologically broad; and broad religious doctrines,
reminiscent of theism and the philosophical belief in an afterlife that Locke
advocated as a religious test, Gladstone argued, are not sufficient for ‘forming
the groundwork of a constitution’ from a religious point of view. In a moral
argument that he would later deploy to different effect, he rejected here
attempts to create a watered down ‘official’ Christianity because they divide
religion into parts (belief in God or in an afterlife without any attending theo-
logical or moral doctrines), whereas religion is an organic whole.31
Views on Toleration
Having dealt with the connection between the state and the true church, Glad-
stone moved on to the second component of his best possible state-toleration.
In doing so he was forced in the 1841 edition of The State in its Relations with
the Church to address the question that preoccupied critics like Macaulay. If
the best possible relationship between church and state entails identification
between the two, how do we escape the traditional penchant for intolerance
and religious coercion found in that model? Gladstone dealt with this question
by dividing it into several parts, defending some uses of state power in reli-
gious affairs while disclaiming others. He rejected the use of force to generate
compliance with a set of religious doctrines or to compel people to disavow
religious views. Persuasion is the only appropriate means for leading people
to God, for spirituality is a matter of choice. Following Locke, he conceded
that the state is incompetent to make judgments that will affect the salvation of
individuals. It can choose and support only institutionally the national reli-
gion that informs the higher life of the state. Like Locke and, more directly,
Bishop Butler, he argued that the choice of correct principles and doctrine is a
matter of probabilities, and judgments based on probabilities are not strong
enough to remove the ‘natural freedom’ that God gives humans to gain their
30 Ibid., pp. 183–6; SRC, II, pp. 271–2.
31 SRC, I, pp. 26, 127, 140; SRC, II, pp. 362–8.
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salvation.32 Moreover, like Locke he argued that coercion can be used to sup-
press the truth; that it tends to corrupt those who administer it; that it is not
necessary to safeguard life and property; and that no direct command from
God approves it. Thus the best possible state embraces an established church
but does not require its citizens to belong to it or to espouse a particular
creed.33
However, Gladstone refused to brand as intolerant or coercive all state
activities that disadvantage persons on religious grounds, just as he refused to
concede that establishment curtails the God-given freedom to choose one’s
path to salvation. He distinguished, for example, between intolerance and the
punishment of blasphemy. Drawing upon a theistically centred account of
persons, he argued that the latter is the legitimate suppression of views that
appeal not to reason but rather to the ‘gross passion’, an appeal that trans-
forms humans from moral beings into brute creatures.34 More important, he
defended measures of ‘civil defence’ that prohibit religious views carrying
political or social consequences, such as views which disavow allegiance to a
monarch or which reject all laws governing society. Again with Locke he
argued that the purpose of these regulations was not to coerce adherence to
religious opinions per se, but to eliminate views dangerous to society. These
are matters of expediency and defence. At the same time Gladstone also pro-
vided an extended justification of religious disqualifications. He granted that
objections to intolerance in general also counted against disqualification, but
maintained that their force was diminished in that sphere. As with his civil-
defence argument, he stated that disqualification rested not on the attempt to
coerce people to accept religious doctrines, but rather on the setting of mini-
mum standards for holding political office, which for the best possible state
must include religious components.35
In direct response to the question of persecution, he argued that employing
religious qualifications as a way of identifying the church with the state would
not inevitably lead to the persecution of dissenters because it was not in the
interest of the state or church to do so. Relying upon the innate benevolence of
political and clerical officials, he argued that they wished to lead dissenters to
the true religion, not destroy them, and therefore neither a monopoly on politi-
cal power nor the establishment of a church should be considered dangerous
to dissenters who are denied office. In his understanding, one can justify dis-
qualification and establishment while rejecting intolerance both descriptively
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32 See ‘Probability as a Guide to Conduct’, in W.E. Gladstone, Gleanings of the Past
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and normatively in the British context.36 Thus, while he would have preferred
a stronger set of qualifications in place, Britain’s law restricting officeholders
to those who can take an oath as a Christian was on these grounds ‘moderate’,
‘prudent’ and ‘warrantable’.37
This discussion of church–state relations, particularly with regard to estab-
lishment, was founded on Gladstone’s original understanding of religious
freedom and toleration and subsequently on his bifurcated religious anthro-
pology. Gladstone consistently argued that religious freedom entails granting
people the right to follow ‘private judgment’ in religious affairs, for people
must find God themselves without coercion. Yet, in a long and detailed dis-
cussion, Gladstone refused to equate ‘private judgment’ with merely follow-
ing one’s ‘individual conscience’. Private judgment genuinely understood, he
argued, is neither one dictated externally by force nor one informed solely by
individual conscience. Institutions also necessarily condition it. As the church
has traditionally held, true private judgment is a faculty informed by the find-
ings of church tribunals, for individuals alone are usually unable fully to grasp
or appreciate Scriptural doctrines. This assertion, one may note, parallelled
his earlier argument that ordinary people are unable to grasp ethical concepts
or follow laws without religious institutions. He summed up this discussion
by observing that if ‘freedom of assent’ was the greatest gift of the Reforma-
tion, the tendency to privilege the individual conscience in religious affairs
and thus to oppose the doctrinal authority of the established national church
was its ‘besetting sin’.38 There was no Miltonian acknowledgment on his part
that the religious freedom he believed essential to true faith could lead one
legitimately to a plurality of religious doctrines because Truth has been scat-
tered, for he argued both that Truth has not been scattered and that ‘private
judgment . . . essentially depends for its right discharge less upon the under-
standing than the conscience’. Nor was there much faith on his part in the
capacity of individuals outside institutions to find their way to true belief and
spiritual knowledge.39
This initial failure to acknowledge either the legitimacy of religious plural-
ism or the possibility of a complete moral individualism led to Gladstone’s
original understanding of toleration as a minimal concept amenable to reli-
gious oaths and an established church. Because he believed that a true under-
standing of religion was dependent upon church authority, and the state had a
36 SRC, I, pp. 325–35. Indeed, he saw the oath of allegiance as a ‘considerable
accommodation’ to Catholics. SRC, II, p. 224.
37 SRC, I, p. 337.
38 SRC, II, pp. 46–52, 94–5.
39 SRC, II, p. 177; also ‘Ward’s Ideal of a Christian Church’, GPY, V, pp. 138–61.
Richard Shannon describes Gladstone’s own dependence on institutions for moral guid-
ance in R. Shannon, Gladstone: 1809–1865 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984), pp. 113–14, 157.
See also Butler, Gladstone, p. 103.
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moral responsibility to support one authority, the early Gladstone adopted the
traditional understanding of toleration that privileged membership in the state
church and granted dissenters mere indulgence. Distinguishing the individ-
ual’s right to choose God freely from the state’s responsibility to tolerate dis-
senters, he specified that in the context of the best possible state, toleration
‘does not imply a recognition of the moral equality of all forms of faith . . .’ or
of judgments regarding faith. Rather, it means merely removing ‘the biasing
and blinding influences of fear from without’ at the same time the state vigor-
ously fulfils its equally important duty to support the true church. Thus, as a
discriminatory concept, toleration ‘presumes the actual preference of one
[form of faith], and includes the passive sufferance of others’.40 This suffer-
ance did not include equal treatment of religious sects or access to political
power on the part of dissenters. Nor did it include the separation of church and
state.
Gladstone thereby harmonized toleration with religious oaths and an estab-
lished church by relying on the institutional portion of his religious anthropol-
ogy to hedge the sphere of religious liberty he was forced to concede to escape
the charge of intolerance and persecution. He did so by specifying simulta-
neously the need for individual liberty (liberty from outside coercion and
imposed religious uniformity) and the necessity of intertwining the state with
an established church (generated by the state’s need for a conscience, the
state’s duty to support the true religion, and the individual’s need for religious
institutions), arguing that both were required for a fully developed state and
the individual’s exercise of private judgment in spiritual matters. This formu-
lation inevitably led him to condemn states that laxly discharged their reli-
gious duties and to criticize the drive to push toleration to its logical, pluralist
conclusion.41
History, Contexts and Practical Judgments
The bulk of Volume II of SRC was given over to a historical discussion of
church–state relations in Britain, reflecting both Gladstone’s penchant for
historical analysis and his conceptualization of the state as a historical being.
Here he posed a series of key questions that moulded his early, practical
approach. Was the principle animating the best possible state at work in Brit-
ain? His answer was yes. The English state and church occupied the preferred
middle ground differentiated from a ‘popish’ external control of church and
state, Erastianism and a secular state populated by independent churches. It
contained a state church that drew political and financial support from the
state and commanded the allegiance of a majority of the population but
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remained in control of its doctrine and ceremonies.42 Were there problems in
the relations between the established church and the state? Yes, some of
which were amenable to solution, some not. Were the problems so serious as
to require that the connection be abandoned? His answer was no — the best
policy was to defend current structures from further deterioration. As he put
it, emphasizing the contextual difference between Britain and other countries:
We still have ground which is defensible, and which is still worth defend-
ing . . . with political institutions in reality very much more popular than
those of France, to say nothing of Prussia, our country seems to promise at
least a more organized, tenacious, and determined resistance to the efforts
against national religion . . .43
In his quest to defend current structures, Gladstone addressed first the ques-
tion of toleration. If the best possible state was one typified by toleration, his
historical discussion faithfully recorded its uneven development in Britain
but concluded that the central problems had been solved. Before the Reforma-
tion, he argued, differences of religious opinion were directly repressed, thus
removing an important part of each individual’s ‘moral freedom’.44 But he
attributed problems since the Reformation mostly to contingent factors rather
than to structure, citing as culprits misguided rulers, the tumults created by
religious differences, and external threats. For example, he argued that as the
Reformation became entangled with the efforts of English monarchs to
defend the country against both Puritan-inspired revolts and threats from
Catholic countries and the Papacy, monarchs were forced to define political
allegiance in religious terms. The result was that when Elizabeth and the Stu-
arts dealt with the political problem of religious dissidents, state and religion
were connected by ‘bonds’ that were ‘drawn tighter than either the infirmities
of human nature or the quality of the subject-matter would warrant’, resulting
in the punishment as well as disqualification of religious dissidents.45
The exception was life under the Puritans, which, he asserted, was afflicted
by structural errors. While Cromwell favoured an extensive toleration, the
Puritans in Parliament preferred a coercive tie between church and state. This
unflattering stance Gladstone attributed to Puritan independency. In the pro-
cess of downplaying the institutional church and exalting the state, the Puri-
tans inexorably transferred theological discipline from the ecclesiastical to
the statist realm, resulting in the judicial punishment of dissent. In short, he
argued that independency plus a strong state encourages religious intolerance.
Consistent with this point he disputed Nonconformist claims to a history of
toleration, maintaining that, as compared to the Anglicans, the Puritans used
42 Ibid., pp. 154–8.
43 Ibid., p. 389.
44 Ibid., p. 283.
45 Ibid., p. 21.
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coercion to punish theological errors, and used it more extensively, for a lon-
ger period and against more people.46
The second topic Gladstone addressed was that of the ‘unity’ between
church and state. The forces that most consistently promoted toleration, he
admitted, also threatened the ties that bound the state to the church.47 While
the Restoration reinstated the established church, and the Reformation and
democratization purged the established church of any lingering problems
regarding toleration, democratization also created ‘disorganization’ in the
state’s actions with regard to religion. Moreover, the practical nature of poli-
tics had weakened those ties. The result was a set of relations between church
and state in Britain that was ‘chequered’.48 He listed numerous connections
between the state and the Church of England, the defence of which was
becoming difficult. Rising education levels and democratization had de-
creased deference and spread power to dissenters who were hostile to these
connections, making the number of those committed to close church–state
relations smaller and the pool of its opponents larger. Modern beliefs were
also to blame. The belief that political privileges are natural rights had weak-
ened the commitment to linking politics with an established church, while,
more ominously, modern ideas about the value of education had displaced the
value of religion in the minds of citizens.49 But even in the face of such views,
Gladstone argued that existing church–state relations should be vigorously
defended in toto.
As part of that argument, Gladstone explored anti-Erastian grounds for
Anglican disestablishment. While he conceded that the British state had hurt
the Church of England in the past, and that the Church of England could live
without formal ties to the state, he nevertheless rejected arguments for its dis-
establishment. He rebutted the generalization Tocqueville drew from the
American experience, which attributed religious vitality to the separation of
church and state, by maintaining that establishment only harms degraded
churches. Disestablishment itself, he argued, will not necessarily improve
churches. He described the Church of England as a vital church well able to
defend itself and in no need of disestablishment.50 Thus, in a move he later
repeated, he resisted pushing his anti-Erastianism to its logical conclusions by
referring to Anglicanism’s strength.
Finally, Gladstone pointed to two important deviations from the best possi-
ble state that he deplored yet was reluctant to challenge. One was the combi-
nation of the state with both the Church of England and the Church of
Scotland, churches ‘not in Christian Communion with each other’. The other
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48 Ibid., pp. 257, 279.
49 Ibid., pp. 392–8.
50 Ibid., p. 385.
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was the annual provision of state funds to Maynooth College in Ireland to sup-
port the training of Roman Catholic priests. In addition to his theoretical
opposition to such arrangements, Gladstone also viewed dubiously the practi-
cal results they achieved. Yet in both cases he refrained from calling for a
return to more consistent positions. Both commitments, he argued, resulted
from attempts to conciliate the populations of those regions to union with
England and represented important state obligations. While those policies
deviated from the tenets of the best possible state and did not necessarily fulfil
their practical aims, he implied that practicality itself demanded their mainte-
nance.51
Continuities and Changes, 1845–83
If, as Morley and others suggest, experiences spurred Gladstone to change
these early views on the relations between church and state, how did this
change manifest itself in arguments regarding disqualification, establish-
ments and other related topics? I argue that in supporting a variety of mea-
sures that weakened the connection between the British state and religion and
simultaneously defended the Church of England’s status as an established
church, Gladstone both changed and conserved important parts of his original
intellectual framework.
Gladstone’s conversion to selective support of the Church of England’s
establishment was the result of several factors. The first factor was an ongoing
contextual analysis that from the mid 1840s progressively recognized impor-
tant changes in Britain’s environment from earlier in the century. One result
of that analysis was an increased appreciation of and emphasis upon religious
diversity. While he continued to believe that the Church of England was the
true church and longed for Christian unity, by the early 1850s religious diver-
sity in Britain became a factor in his considerations that went well beyond
what he had acknowledged in SRC. ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’ attributed
the beginnings of this greatly enhanced appreciation to his perusal of Irish
census results and his ‘discovery’ in 1850 of the large increase in the number
of Nonconformist places of worship in England. Those beginnings may have
been reinforced by his personal and political contacts with Nonconformists,
and by his continued, albeit diminished, contacts with Henry Manning and
John Newman.52
51 Ibid., pp. 280–305. His position in SRC reflects a change to a less rigid stance.
Compare Letter to H.E. Manning, 2 April 1837, and Letter to H.E. Manning, 23 April
1837, with Letter to James Lord, 8 October 1841, in Correspondence on Church and
Religion of William Ewart Gladstone, ed. D.C. Lathbury (2 vols., New York, 1910),
Vol. II, pp. 29–39, 51–2.
52 For his greater appreciation of religious diversity, see ‘The Courses of Religious
Thought’, GPY, III, pp. 102–25, ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY ,VII, pp. 124, 144,
and ‘The Place of Heresy and Schism in the Modern Christian Church’, LG, pp. 289–96.
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The other result of this contextual analysis involved his assessment of the
British state. Whereas in SRC Gladstone had assumed that Parliament could
freeze the effect of changes in politics and population, by the mid 1840s he
admitted that those developments had profoundly affected the state, and iden-
tified himself as one of the last supporters of a churchly regime. Britain was in
transition from a natural, organic entity that resembled a ‘family’ in its reli-
gious affairs (as did Austria and Russia) to an entity that resembled a club (as
did the United States and France). Thus he acknowledged that momentum had
shifted in favour of further loosening the ties between church and state.53
The second factor involved changes in his understanding of the practical
effects of the relationship between church and state. In later life Gladstone
exhibited a greater appreciation of the danger the state posed to the church;
thus anti-Erastianism played a larger role in his analysis. But, more tellingly,
he came to accept that those relations could also harm the state, a proposition
he did not entertain in SRC but invoked in the Irish debates.54
The third factor was the cumulative methodological result of the first two:
Gladstone abandoned his ‘best possible state’ analysis both normatively and
descriptively. No longer interested in preserving a churchly state, he began
conceptualizing his understanding of church–state affairs in terms of the nar-
rower goals of maintaining British stability and defending the Church of Eng-
land’s established status. In describing his approach to the latter goal, he
argued in 1847 that those like himself who defended the established church
must be willing ‘to part earlier and more freely and cordially, than heretofore
with some such of her privileges, here and there, as may be more obnoxious
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Schreuder in ‘The Role of Morley and Knaplund’, pp. 215–17, and ‘Gladstone and the
Conscience of the State’, pp. 103, 106, provides a qualified version of this argument. See
also Butler, Gladstone, p. 121, and The Gladstone Diaries, ed. Matthew, Vol. 7, p. xxviii.
Evidence for the influence of personal and political contacts is tentative. For example,
consideration of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill occurred at approximately the same time as
Hope and Manning were leaving Anglicanism (February/March 1851). Also beginning
in 1864, at about the time he began making known his theoretical decision to support a
change in the Irish establishment (‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY ,VII, p. 129), The
Gladstone Diaries show a considerable number of social, religious and political contacts
with Nonconformists, and an increased attention to Nonconformist views inside and out-
side the House with regard to Parliamentary and party affairs. Compare Matthew’s
observation in The Gladstone Diaries, Vol. 3, p. lv, with Vol. 14 [Index], p. 769. Of
course he was dependent upon Nonconformist votes, as well as Newman, in his struggle
for Irish disestablishment despite the other problems he experienced with both. How-
ever, he was willing to part with them on the question of Anglican disestablishment.
53 Letter to J.H. Newman, 19 April 1845, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. I,
pp. 71–4; ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY, VII, p. 98.
54 Also ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY, VII, p. 151: ‘an Establishment leaning
for support upon the extraneous aid of a State, which becomes discredited with the peo-
ple by the very act of lending it’.
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than really valuable . . . and further, not to presume too much to give direc-
tions to the State as to its policy with respect to other religious bodies’.55
As evidenced by the last part of this quotation, a fourth factor was also fun-
damentally important to Gladstone’s change. Gladstone’s abandonment of a
churchly state cleared the way for him to act politically on his increased
appreciation of religious diversity by converting that appreciation into a nor-
mative commitment. His understanding of religious freedom broadened to
include more than the absence of coercion or ‘passive sufferance’ — it now
meant equal protection. This meant that his defence of establishment came to
incorporate an equal consideration of the claims of religiously diverse popu-
lations.56 As he put it during the election of 1865, he rejected policies that
defended the church by ‘maintaining odious distinction against our Roman
Catholic or dissenting fellow-subjects’.57
But despite the variety of changes listed above, and regardless of his anti-
Erastian doubts and commitment to placing religious orthodoxy above politi-
cal connections, to the end of his life Gladstone maintained his belief that the
British state should support the Church of England in its institutional mission
of fostering the true faith among the populace,58 and it is clear that he would
have continued to support the establishment of the Church of Ireland had it
not failed to convert the Irish, a failure that robbed it of its spiritual legitimacy
and created political instability.59 The fundamental explanation for this stub-
born allegiance to establishment in the face of his recognition of spiritual plu-
ralism, I argue, was Gladstone’s persistent adherence to his original religious
anthropology and to his historicism. While he continued to privilege contexts
to draw distinctions in both time and space as he had done earlier,60 and sus-
tained his reliance upon the kinds of practical judgments that mark SRC, these
methodological continuities yielded a variety of results later in his life and
cannot by themselves account for his commitment to religious freedom or to
Anglican establishment, much less to both simultaneously.
The consistency of his substantive views on religious anthropology and
historicism was, in contrast, fundamental to explaining all these positions.
55 Letter to R.J. Phillimore, 24 June 1847, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. II,
pp. 13–14, and ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY, VII, pp. 149–51.
56 For religious equality and the correct analysis of establishments, see ‘A Chapter of
Autobiography’, GPY, VII, pp. 125, 128, 150–1. Butler adopts Gladstone’s term of ‘so-
cial justice’. See Butler, Gladstone, pp. 120, 130.
57 Quoted in Shannon, Gladstone, p. 54.
58 See ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Church of England’, LG esp. p. 192, and ‘A Chapter
of Autobiography’, GPY ,VII, pp. 146–8.
59 See the Letter to Sir R. Phillimore, 13 February 1865, in Correspondence, ed.
Lathbury, Vol. I, p. 168, and ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY, VII, pp. 123–5.
60 ‘Kin Beyond the Sea’, GPY, I, pp. 239–47. ‘The Sixteenth Century Arraigned
Before the Nineteenth’, GPY, III, p. 264, stresses change. See also Schreuder, ‘Gladstone
and the Conscience of the State’, p. 89.
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Both the early and late Gladstone depicted humans as requiring freedom from
outside coercion in religious affairs, a depiction that spilled over into his
understanding of equal protection. Likewise, although he came to grant a
greater role to reason in religion,61 he also continued to emphasize that it was
the institutions of the church that allowed people fully and truly to pursue
spiritual lives.62 The result was that alongside his commitment to religious
freedom and equal protection, he continued to highlight the institutional
nature of the church in its necessary role of preserving religious doctrines and
guiding the spiritual and intellectual lives of individuals and the nation. This
corporatist aspect of his religious anthropology was part of his overall privi-
leging of institutions as key to human development. While he lessened his
emphasis on the state, he consistently viewed institutions like the Church of
England and the universities, with their organizational structures, discipline
and traditions, as essential to preserving knowledge and to serving as the
means to new understandings, acting as ‘great mediating power[s] between
the high and the low, between the old and the new, between speculation and
practice, between authority and freedom’.63 He in turn combined this
anthropological institutionalism with a persistently organic and historical
conceptualization of England. England for Gladstone was always defined as
fundamentally by its history as by its current composition. The institutions
that best discharged their functions for the good of England, he argued, were
those rooted in English history; and since the Church of England was embed-
ded in English history, it had necessary connections with English life.64
The continuity of Gladstone’s dualistic religious anthropology linked the
disparate parts of his later discussions of church–state policies. Its individual-
istic side, stressing freedom from coercion, supported his principle of equal
protection in the removal of religious oaths and the Irish establishment, while
its institutional side, combined with his historicism, prevented him from
abandoning the concept of establishment and the Anglican establishment in
particular. Only by reference to this framework, I contend, can we understand
his flexible, contextually sensitive use of practical reasoning in later life to
address questions of church and state.
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61 For a good example, see ‘Dawn of Creation and Worship’, LG, pp. 1–39.
62 For an early view, see ‘Blanco White’, GPY, II, p. 40; for later views see ‘The
Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion’, GPY, III, pp. 145–71; ‘The Sixteenth Cen-
tury Arraigned Before the Nineteenth’, GPY, III, pp. 236, 251–4; ‘Robert Elsmere: The
Battle of Belief’, LG, pp. 77–117, passim; ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Church of England’,
LG, p. 205; and ‘The Place of Heresy and Schism in the Modern Christian Church’, LG,
p. 309.
63 See ‘Inaugural Address: The Work of Universities’, GPY, VII, pp. 1–14, and
‘Memoir of Dr. Norman McLeod’, GPY, II, pp. 349–50.
64 See ‘The Sixteenth Century Arraigned before the Nineteenth’, GPY, III, pp.
244–50; ‘Remarks on the Royal Supremacy’, GPY, V, esp. p. 222, and ‘The Church of
England and Ritualism’, GPY, VI, pp. 159–60.
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Gladstone’s Support for Religious Liberty and Disestablishment
To support this explanation, I examine samples of Gladstone’s later argu-
ments supporting equal protection, the removal of religious oaths, and Irish
disestablishment. I then discuss his defence of the Anglican establishment. I
begin by documenting Gladstone’s commitment to a principle of equal
protection.
Religious Liberty and Equal Protection
By 1847 Gladstone began putting his case for eliminating some of the ties
between church and state on both practical grounds (their defence would
backfire on the church and complicate affairs of state) and on the grounds that
the ties themselves violated the principle of religious liberty and denied equal
protection to minority religious groups. In one letter he characterized a
scheme to extend civil privileges to all but Catholics and Unitarians as a move
that ‘grievously violates social justice’.65 Likewise he characterized his sup-
port for the removal of Jewish disabilities as reflecting ‘a simple debt which I
think is owed to civil justice . . .’.66 He described attempts by churchmen to
deny privileges to Catholics and lead a campaign in Parliament under the
banner of ‘No Popery’ as an attempt to lock the state into ‘a negative and
repressive policy’.67 He justified his opposition to the bill against ‘Papal
Aggression’, discussed below, not only on the grounds that it would have the
practical and negative effect of dividing the country; it was also, in his words,
‘politically unjust’.68 Even earlier his ruminations on the Irish Establishment
had been framed in terms of ‘social justice’, as he had asked in 1845 whether
that principle would ‘warrant the permanent maintenance of the Irish Church
as it is’.69 Later, when writing of the Bradlaugh case, he prefaced his remark
that continued opposition to the seating of Bradlaugh would serve only to
‘weaken reverence for religion’ with an analysis similar to that he used in
favouring the admission of Jews to the House in 1847,70 concluding that ‘it is
65 Letter to R.J. Phillimore, 24 June 1847, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. II,
p. 14.
66 Letter to C.E. Radclyffe, 19 February 1853, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury,
Vol. I, p. 124.
67 Letter to J.W. Warter, 21 July 1847, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. II, p. 16.
68 Letter to W.F. Hook, 23 June 1851, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. I,
p. 122.
69 Letter to H.E. Manning, 6 March 1845, quoted in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury,
Vol. I, p. 149.
70 Hansard, 8 December 1847, cols. 1282–1303.
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best to recognize frankly that religious differences are not to entail civil dis-
abilities’.71
We similarly find that he embraced an understanding of equal protection
that flowed from a full acknowledgment of religious diversity in his Parlia-
mentary objections to the Ecclesiastical Titles Assumptions Act of 1851. This
law forbade the Catholic Church to create ecclesiastical districts and titles that
contained English place names, ostensibly to prevent the papacy from laying
claim to secular authority over England.72 In addition to referring to the harm-
ful political consequences of the bill and its boomerang effect on Catholics
who were fighting ultramontanism, Gladstone argued repeatedly that the bill
would infringe upon the ‘principle of religious freedom’ that protects all reli-
gious groups. This principle was constituted by ‘a line that is drawn between
the spiritual and the temporal’ that the state cannot traverse unless a real dan-
ger is imminent. He outlined his principle as follows: ‘[I]f I understand any-
thing of the doctrine of religious liberty . . . it implies that within the scope of
religious action Parliament was not to intrude . . . it is their [religious groups’]
absolute right to make rules for the regulation of their religious concerns’.73
He then characteristically bolstered this with an argument from history
regarding the development of religious liberty, condemning John Hampden
and John Pym in particular for their ‘bitter and ferocious intolerance which in
them became the more powerful because it was directed against the Roman
Catholics alone’.
This last quotation led to further and more explicit invocations of equal
protection. He asserted that the bill would deny Catholics ‘the fullest enjoy-
ment of religious equality’. Arguing that other denominations attached place
names to their religious units, and that the Scottish church was explicitly
excluded from the bill, he pointed out that the bill was aimed only at Catho-
lics, and maintained that Parliament had ‘no right to deny them anything
which you give to any other body or denomination of Christians among us’. ‘I
cannot desire,’ he stated, ‘that an exceptional system of civil privileges or
civil toleration should be created for one class of men, from which others
standing in similar circumstances, are to be excluded’. He ‘protest[ed] . . .
against [the bill’s] unequal application’ and pleaded with the House not to
‘extort’ from the doctrine of royal supremacy a policy that was ‘unfavourable
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71 Letter to J.C. Hubbard, 11 June 1881, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury, Vol. I,
p. 176.
72 ‘Ecclesiastical Titles Assumption Bill’, Adjourned Debate, Hansard, 25 March
1851, cols. 565–96.
73 He also later disapproved of compulsory religious exercises in public schools. See
‘The Place of Heresy and Schism in the Modern Christian Church’, LG, pp. 298–304, and
Letter to the Rev. Septimus Buss, 13 September 1894, in Correspondence, ed. Lathbury,
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to religious liberty’ or involved ‘a partial and exceptional application to the
case of Roman Catholics’.
Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Church of Ireland (1868, 1869)
Gladstone spoke three times in the House in 1868 and 1869 in favour of dis-
establishing the Church of Ireland.74 On all three occasions he relied upon two
lines of argument: that there was a crisis in Irish affairs that had its origins in
the denial of equal protection, and that those origins as well as other elements
distinguished the Church of Ireland from the Church of England in his theory
of establishment. Thus practical judgments were important parts of his argu-
ment for Irish disestablishment, but were refracted through other intellectual
components.
Gladstone prefaced his justifications of Irish disestablishment with exer-
cises in practical judgment that identified Ireland as a place mired in conflict
and crisis and thus as a threat to the stability of the British state. Ireland, he
argued, was in a deplorable condition. Widespread sympathy for the Fenians,
a general estrangement of ordinary Irishmen from Britain, and conflict between
Catholics and Protestants marked the current era. The result was the general
acquiescence of governments of all parties to desperate measures to keep the
peace, including the serial suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and the use of
the army as an occupying force.
A response to this crisis was needed, he maintained, and Parliament and the
people of the country had agreed that fundamental changes to the Church of
Ireland must be part of it. He portrayed those changes as necessary to avert a
political calamity connected with the chronic problems that afflicted contem-
porary Ireland. The persistent crisis in Irish affairs, he argued, had its origins
in large part in a violation of equal protection — the establishment of the
Church of Ireland. That church served only a small proportion of the popula-
tion, the majority of which adhered to a different Christian denomination. Its
support for coercive laws had perverted its spiritual mission and created a
spirit of domination and bigotry. As one of the symbols of the English ascen-
dancy, it kept alive ‘painful and bitter memories’ in the minds of the general
population of Ireland. Thus he argued that disestablishment was morally in
line with admitting Catholics to the franchise and funding Maynooth, policies
that were agreed to not only because they attained the practical goal of reduc-
ing instability but also because they reflected the desire of statesmen like Pitt
to treat equally the various religious groups in Ireland.75
Intimately connected with this argument was Gladstone’s other gambit —
that the history and condition of Ireland and the Church of Ireland made dis-
establishment logical and proper from the standpoint of his theory of
74 Hansard, 30 March 1868, and 1 March and 23 March 1869.
75 For a similar analysis, see ‘A Chapter of Autobiography’, GPY, VII, p. 151.
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establishment. While he had acknowledged in SRC historical abuses and the
failure of that church to win converts, his support for Irish establishment there
was firm. He had argued that past errors did not change the truth the church
had to offer, that establishment was necessary to strengthen the political
bonds of the empire, and that the British government knew best in terms of
religion. The result was a romantic analysis of the Church of Ireland’s situa-
tion.76 Here in contrast he pointed to a changed context that shed a different
light on the history of Ireland and the history and mission of that church. In
this he was careful to distinguish between the history, moral status and practi-
cability of the Church of Ireland and those of the Church of England. Whereas
the latter was deemed ‘good and efficient for its purpose’, the former was not.
It had failed in its mission of converting the Irish to Anglicanism. He argued
that while establishments in general are good things, any particular establish-
ment must be justified ultimately by the fulfilment of its mission — serving
the populace in bringing true religion; and this, he argued, had not occurred.
Departing from the optimistic stance in SRC, he was more deeply influenced
here by a history of failures. He argued that the historical record not only of
the past several hundred years, but also of the last thirty (since the publication
of SRC)77 showed that hope for Irish conversion was misplaced. Only when
coercive laws were in force did the nominal adherents of the Church of Ire-
land approach majority status, and this reliance on coercion he rejected as
incompatible with religious freedom (as well as with financial prudence). It
was preferable, he argued, to return to the ecclesiastical situation before the
Civil War, when no Irish church enjoyed establishment or public endowment.
This would not only bring peace to the state, but also, to return to the themes
of differentiation and practicality, free the Church of England from an associ-
ation ‘which politically is odious and dangerous’.
It is important to note on which grounds Gladstone stood in his move to dis-
establish the Church of Ireland. While much of his argument drew on practi-
cal judgments, including assessments of the harm continued establishment
inflicted on the state, important and necessary arguments held that this estab-
lishment caused harm because it violated equal protection, and that the
Church of Ireland did not meet the standards of an established church, includ-
ing the stipulation that church membership be voluntary. At bottom were both
his understanding of equal protection and his conceptualization of an estab-
lished church based on his religious anthropology — it is a true church, sup-
ported by the state, spreading the true religion to a large majority of a willing
populace. Conditions in Ireland, he argued, would not allow the Church of
Ireland to meet that definition; thus the continued existence of its estab-
lishment violated equal protection and created the problems of unrest and
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instability. Therefore his understanding of equal protection and religious
anthropology ultimately guided his practical embrace of disestablishment.
His practical reasoning was also of a kind consistent with his usage in SRC.
In both places he privileged context and history such that his understanding of
practicality was brought to bear through only them. The danger to the state
that he identified with establishment stemmed from important historical cir-
cumstances and was confined to the peculiar conditions of Ireland.
Admission of Atheists to Parliament (1883)
Gladstone became involved in 1883 in the case of Mr Bradlaugh, a professed
atheist elected to sit for Northampton in the House of Commons. Bradlaugh
wished to swear the oath of allegiance necessary to sit in the House, but had
been barred by Parliamentary officials. After several years of legal wrangling,
the government proposed that the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866 be amended
to allow members to affirm their allegiance without reference to religious
grounds. Opponents argued that such a move was quite different from the
admission of Catholics and Jews into Parliament. It would radically alter the
nature of Parliament by serving to ‘divorce the House from the very elements
of religion’, admit people whose integrity was in question because their con-
sciences were not bound by religious principles, and endanger religion in gen-
eral by the admission of those who sought to ‘damage or destroy the existing
religions of the country’, arguments consciously echoing those Gladstone had
earlier espoused.78
Gladstone, speaking for the Government as prime minister, defended the
bill first by linking it with the admission of Catholics and Jews to the House.79
In SRC, he had supported religious tests on two grounds: as general require-
ments for office-holding, like property and citizenship requirements, and as
political defences justified by Britain’s experiences. In 1883 he emphasized
the link between toleration and equal protection to reject the general-
requirements argument, and referred to a contextual recognition of equal pro-
tection for Catholics and Jews to discard the civil-defence argument.
Gladstone disposed of the general-requirements argument by abandoning
his previous assertions that religious qualifications were defensible in Eng-
land because it approximated the best possible state. He now argued that the
previous admission of Catholics and Jews to public office had cut the connec-
tion between religious profession and eligibility to hold office. Eligibility was
currently a matter of liberty, and as such must be equally distributed, not
offered up ‘by halves, by quarters, and by fractions’. His contextualist argu-
ment regarding civil defence began consistently with SRC; he argued that
78 See the speech of Sir H. Drummond Wolff, Hansard, 26 April 1883, cols.
1168–73.
79 Hansard, 26 April 1883, cols. 1174–95.
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oaths and religious tests had been introduced only in Elizabeth’s time, and
then with the purpose of ascertaining loyalty to political institutions. But he
now emphasized that loyalty to the state was not an issue. As the state
assumed the loyalty of all people regardless of their religion, a correct reading
of the law was that the state ‘did not interpose barriers against access to
this House’. Toleration meant equal protection and equal rights, with no
distinctions made among Anglicans, Catholics, Jews and atheists. To deny
Bradlaugh admission meant denying this change in context, he argued.80
Gladstone’s other line of argument drew more heavily upon his previous
stance rejecting generic oaths and tests, and included an intricate use of practi-
cal judgments that flowed from his religious anthropology to discard as ‘im-
practical’ a dependence on an oath to defend Christian institutions. In SRC,
Gladstone drew upon the corporatist part of his religious anthropology to
argue that an oath or test that affirmed only an abstract belief in Christianity or
God was not useful to defending a strong connection between Christianity and
the state, as the definition of such abstract beliefs would be up to each individ-
ual to determine, and such tests tended to divide religion into parts when it is
an organic whole.81 Gladstone asserted likewise here. A requirement to swear
by reference to God does nothing to screen out people hostile to Christianity,
he argued, since not only would it miss atheists who hide their beliefs and
have no qualms in taking the oath, but anti-Christian deists like Voltaire
would be welcomed. Rather than defend the Christian nature of the House, the
only effect of such an oath, Gladstone maintained, was to force sincere athe-
ists to do violence to their consciences in order to enjoy the political rights that
were rightfully theirs. Moreover, he argued that upholding as necessary for
office an abstract belief in God was ‘disparaging to Christianity’ as it ‘di-
vide[s] religion into the dispensible and the indispensible’ whereas all ele-
ments are necessary.82
In these arguments Gladstone worked from the viewpoint he had embraced
since the late 1840s — that since the best possible state was no longer defensible,
the political constraints that arose with such a state were no longer justifiable.
Equal protection was now the norm. He also utilized his appreciation of reli-
gious diversity to establish the primacy of equal protection. While no admirer
of Bradlaugh’s theological views, he held that as a matter of both principle
and contextual judgment Bradlaugh must be admitted, for the British state had
divorced religious affiliation from eligibility for office. This connection
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80 Stansky, Gladstone, pp. 144–50, emphasizes Gladstone’s references to rights and
his practicality here.
81 SRC, II, pp. 367–8. Morley’s discussion of this speech does not connect the earlier
and later Gladstonian views on this subject. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Glad-
stone, Vol. III, pp. 19–21.
82 Stansky, Gladstone, pp. 149–51, gives a different gloss. For Gladstone’s later
belief in the unity of religion, see ‘Robert Elsmere’ and ‘The Place of Heresy and Schism
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Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM & PRACTICAL REASONING 113
between context and equal protection was therefore one key to his changed
views. The second was a partial continuation from his previous position — the
practical judgment, stemming from his religious anthropology, that generic
religious oaths cannot defend the Christian character of the Parliament. But
where earlier he had used it as an argument for strengthening religious oaths,
he used it here in support of equal protection as an argument against religious
oaths.
Gladstone’s Defence of the Established Church of England (1871, 1873)
While Gladstone’s stance on religious oaths and Irish disestablishment repre-
sented important changes in his outlook, regarding the Church of England he
remained consistently in support of its establishment. He refused on several
occasions to extend to that church his position on the Church of Ireland. That
is not to say that he never pondered whether it might be better off if disestab-
lished. In response to the Gorham Case and Parliamentary attempts to purge it
of ‘ritualism’, he hinted that cutting ties with the state was warranted if the
historical basis of the establishment was illegitimately altered to allow politi-
cal interference in church doctrine. But, as he put it on the latter occasion, ‘My
object and desire has ever been and still is, to keep the Church of England
together, both as a church and as an establishment’.83 Here I discuss concur-
rently two of Gladstone’s addresses on Anglican disestablishment.
On the heels of the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, the Liberal
member for Bradford, Mr Miall, twice introduced motions that the govern-
ment apply the same policy to all established churches in Great Britain, the
first time on the grounds of the ‘social, moral and religious advantage’ that
would accrue to the nation, and the second by reference to the benefits the
established churches would enjoy. Gladstone as prime minister opposed both
motions by drawing upon his contextual method, his historicism and his reli-
gious anthropology.84
In both addresses, Gladstone argued that the orientation of the government
on the question of disestablishment, contrary to some glosses of its policy on
Ireland, was not a matter of abstract principles but of concrete cases. He fol-
lowed no principle of separation of church and state, and he explicitly rejected
the anti-Erastian generalization that disestablishment was helpful to all churches
because he rejected the proposition that establishment ‘in itself is harmful to
religion’. It was the circumstances of establishment that were key to govern-
ment policy. In addressing the question of the Church of Ireland, he maintained,
the government was tending to its peculiar circumstances and concluded that
disestablishment was a matter of ‘social justice’, given that the church was a
83 Quoted in Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Vol. II, p. 502. For his
views on the Gorham Case see ‘Remarks on the Royal Supremacy’, GPY, V, pp.
173–289.
84 Hansard, 9 May 1871, cols. 559–71, and 16 May 1873, cols. 37–49.
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foreign imposition, its membership was a minority of its inhabitants, and the
majority of the population wished to see it disestablished. Gladstone underscored
this contextually sensitive application of equal protection to the Irish case, as
he wanted to argue that the Anglican establishment was different on all these
counts and thus its continued establishment did not violate equal protection.
Gladstone made this point in a variety of ways. The most direct way was to
highlight evidence suggesting a majority of the English supported the Church
of England. He argued that, contrary to the claims of Nonconformists, its
membership comprised a majority of the people in the nation. At one point he
asserted that over three-quarters of the population were at least nominal mem-
bers. He also maintained that the nation overwhelmingly rejected the idea of
disestablishment, a position reflected in the views of a majority in the Com-
mons. In contrast to his position on the Bradlaugh controversy, he argued here
that these majorities should be heeded.
To this democratic point he attached a fundamental practical objection. To
forge ahead with such a project, particularly in the face of public opposition,
would be impossible since it would involve a project more complex and diffi-
cult than was the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, a task he said was
the most complicated legislatively and logistically of any the British govern-
ment had ever tackled.85 It would require sorting out the complex set of rights
of its members and officers, who numbered in the tens of thousands. The
question of compensation was also daunting: Gladstone cited a figure of
ninety million pounds, an astronomical sum. In these arguments, Gladstone
implied that the English situation was the opposite of the Irish. In Ireland dis-
establishment was complicated despite the fact that it was popular with the
vast majority of the population and was a matter of equal protection. In Eng-
land the proceedings themselves would probably trigger the kind of popular
unrest that Irish disestablishment was meant to forestall because the kind of
religious diversity found in Ireland was absent.
Gladstone’s other arguments defended the Church of England’s vitality,
emphasized its institutional role, and privileged its historical connections
with England. He quoted Döllinger to the effect that its clergy and laypeople
were among the shining lights of Christendom. He also outlined an extensive
array of institutional tasks it performed. It cared for the spiritual needs of those
deadened to religion; it was deeply involved in educational and charitable
works; and, he argued, it was intimately and necessarily involved in the
shaping and enlightening of public opinion in all its facets. It provided impor-
tant connections with other parts of the universal church; it pointed to the
future of Christianity; it defended political freedom; it provided the spiritual
guidance and intellectual resources necessary to resolve conflicts between
science and religion; and it provided a way of reconciling the ancient with
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the modern. In this, he argued, other religious institutions were not on a
par with the Church of England. The role of the latter had been fundamental.
Harkening back to the historical text of SRC, Gladstone argued that the church
was organically intertwined with the history and traditions of England.86 In
important ways it represented, characterized, expressed and reflected the
development of the English nation as a whole. It was ‘the growth of the his-
tory and traditions of the country’. As such it was psychologically important
to the vast majority of the English, who had become attached to it through its
thirteen hundred years as the nation’s leading religious institution. Given their
formative role, its religious functions were ‘vital’ to the history and the future
of the nation. ‘Take the Church of England out of the history of England,’ he
argued, ‘and the history of England becomes a chaos, without order, without
life, and without meaning.’
Here Gladstone rejected disestablishment as a principle while referring to
his religious anthropology, contextual differentiations, historical arguments
and practical judgments to argue that in this instance disestablishment was
unnecessary and impractical. There was no need to change the institutional
status quo of the English establishment, he argued, because there was no real
change from the religious homogeneity of the past that would require such an
alteration, nor were there important and recognizably different administrative
problems. Equally important was the fact that the Church of England was
admirably performing the functions he expected of a religious institution, and
performance of those duties made it inseparable from England. To disestab-
lish it would fundamentally change English life and ‘leave nothing behind but
a bleeding and lacerated mass’. In this analysis the Church of England’s
establishment was proper because that legal status did not violate equal pro-
tection. The church continued to provide institutional resources to the major-
ity of the population, the church was intimately connected with the life and
history of the nation, and a majority wished to retain the status quo. Therefore
any calculus, practical or moral, would show that the enormous costs of dis-
establishment were unjustifiable.
Conclusion
I argue that a primary emphasis on Gladstone’s practicality (or lack thereof)
cannot account for the maze of positions he took on matters of church and
state. While others have rightly argued that practical judgments played a role
in his later decisions to embrace a greater scope of religious freedom and to
question religious establishments, a comparison of his earlier and later views
demonstrates not only that such judgments were present in the thinking of
86 Also ‘The Sixteenth Century Arraigned Before the Nineteenth’, GPY, III, pp.
224–73.
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both the young and the mature Gladstone, but also that they did not determine
the views of the latter.
It is necessary to pin down the role practical judgments played in Glad-
stone’s arguments. Probably the most important practical judgment under-
lying his decision to support religious freedoms was the conclusion that a
defence of the ‘best possible state’ was no longer feasible. But while it made
available his decisions to adopt equal protection, oppose religious oaths, and
support disestablishment, no direct line can be drawn from that judgment to
those positions; and that judgment itself was crucially dependent upon his
contextually informed appreciation of religious diversity. More directly,
practical judgments also peppered his arguments on Irish disestablishment
and the admission of Jews and atheists to Parliament. Here, too, my conclu-
sion is that these judgments played a secondary role. They were parasitic upon
other elements of his intellectual framework, particularly his emphasis on
equal protection. In the absence of his commitment to equal protection,
Gladstone would not have conceded that disestablishing the Church of Ireland
was the right response to the Irish troubles, or argued that the Ecclesiastical
Titles Assumption Act was the wrong response to ultramontanism. Without a
prior understanding that sitting in the House was a matter of equal protection,
he also would not have offered the pragmatic argument that opposition to
seating Bradlaugh generated support for atheism.
Another important observation is that Gladstone used practical judgments
both to justify religious freedom and to defend strong ties between church and
state. We see that while he used practical judgments later in life to help justify
a partial dismantling of the state’s ties with churches, such reasoning played a
role in his early justifications of a churchly state when he argued that such a
state enjoys low levels of crime, moral political leaders and a stable constitu-
tional order. Moreover, even after he abandoned his defence of a churchly
state he continued to use practical reasoning to identify insuperable problems
with the project of disestablishing the Church of England.
These observations, I argue, illustrate the importance of Gladstone’s funda-
mental philosophy, and the dependence of his practical reasoning on that phi-
losophy. We have in Gladstone someone whose philosophical views were not
completely liberal. This was the cause of his mixed positions on issues of reli-
gious freedom, a cause that his practical judgments failed to overcome. Thus
while Gladstone favoured Irish disestablishment on practical as well as moral
grounds and despite rejecting the principle of disestablishment, he also opposed
Anglican disestablishment on practical grounds and because he rejected that
principle. On this point it is important to compare Gladstone’s position on
Anglican disestablishment with his position on the issues of ecclesiastical
titles, the admission of Jews and atheists to Parliament, and Irish disestablish-
ment. This comparison indicates that Gladstone usually supported liberal
freedoms when he yoked practical judgment to a recognition of religious
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diversity, his principle of equal protection, and the parts of his religious
anthropology that emphasized freedom of conscience, while he refused to
support disestablishment when he joined practical judgments to the insti-
tutionalist part of his religious anthropology and his historicist conceptualiza-
tion of Britain.87
We also see that Gladstone’s historicism and the institutionalist side of his
religious anthropology tended to trump his principle of equal protection. This
is revealed most clearly in the two disestablishment cases, where his analysis
of the connection between the respective churches and the populations they
served was mixed with his historicism and his privileging of institutional reli-
gion. If by 1868 Gladstone was willing to disestablish the Irish church, it was
because he saw it as alien to Ireland and therefore incapable of discharging the
duties of an established church. The claims of the religiously diverse popula-
tion of Ireland and the instability they caused could then come to the fore. But
he never acquiesced to the disestablishment of the Church of England because
he viewed it as intrinsically part of a historical England and continued to
believe it fulfilled the duties of an established church. Those views, along
with arguments connecting that church with the bulk of the English popula-
tion and extolling its vigour, were decisive, leading him to maintain that
establishment posed no equal-protection problems in England even in the face
of the considerable religious diversity he had earlier acknowledged.
To conclude, I sketch the implications of these findings for our understand-
ing of Gladstone and for a consideration of liberal freedoms in general.
Regarding Gladstone, they suggest a closer connection between his philo-
sophical views and his politics than other descriptions sometimes hold. I of
course argue that this examination of Gladstone does not support the explana-
tion, crudely put, that he abandoned his earlier philosophical views on church
and state in favour of political pragmatism. Philosophical elements that were
important to his earlier views lingered in the arguments of the later Gladstone.
But several other observations are also important. One is that Gladstone’s phi-
losophy did importantly change, in the form of his rejection of a churchly
state, his elevation of religious diversity, and his acceptance of equal protec-
tion. Without those changes he would not have acquiesced to the elimination of
religious oaths or to Irish disestablishment. Thus Vidler’s and Helmstadter’s
descriptions of Gladstone as completely retaining his former views also are
not quite right. Nor are Parry and Butler correct in attributing his support for
religious freedom to a change to Tractarian anti-Erastianism. The other obser-
vation is that his later views on establishment in general were significantly
shaped by philosophical continuities, namely his historicism and his dualistic
religious anthropology. Thus if we accept Stansky’s and Schreuder’s argu-
ment that Gladstone’s positions incorporated a mixture of conservatism and
87 Though the institutionalist, organic part of his religious anthropology did play a
role in his opposition to religious oaths in the Bradlaugh case.
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progressivism, an explanation for that mixture must refer to these parts of his
core philosophical beliefs.
This examination also bears upon questions pertaining to the roles of prac-
tical reasoning, value pluralism and modus vivendi in the development of lib-
eral freedoms. John Gray and Andrew Murphy have recently argued against
the position that particular philosophical views are necessary to the development
of such goods as religious freedom.88 Instead they insist that value pluralism
and a rational, practical modus vivendi are generally sufficient to create a free
society. The conclusions drawn here are suggestive and preliminary, indicat-
ing only on which side of the debate over such issues we should place Glad-
stone’s evidence. With that said, Gladstone’s example not only tends to
confirm the observation that practical reason itself is undirected, as Gutmann
and Thompson argue in approving of Wertheimer’s contention that we must
‘point’ reason to use it to reach liberal goals;89 it also indicates that a person
can use practical reason flexibly to justify quite different policies (on estab-
lishment, for example) given a dualistic anthropology. Second, Gladstone’s
example suggests that practical judgments tend to justify liberal freedoms
only when they are informed by a philosophical principle (here equal protec-
tion) that points beyond modus vivendi. We see this illustrated by Gladstone’s
changing views on toleration. Early in his career he clung to an understanding
typical of modus vivendi — toleration means sufferance, not equality. Only
when he explicitly embraced the tenet of equal protection did his practical
judgments lead to the vigorous protection of religious dissenters’ political
rights. Thus while practical judgments in a modus vivendi situation may be
useful to the justification of isolated liberal freedoms, in Gladstone’s case
they were not sufficient for that purpose even given his initial recognition in
SRC of the existence of diverse religious groups.
One may also infer from Gladstone’s example that the presence of one or a
few philosophical principles may likewise be insufficient to the development
of a comprehensive set of liberal freedoms. While equal protection appears
necessary to that development, without the support of other liberal views
describing the self and the world its reach appears limited. In this example the
absence of such views led to Gladstone’s later use of historicism and the
institutionalist side of his religious anthropology to trump equal protection
concerns in the matter of the Anglican establishment. So while it appears
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unlikely that Gladstone would have supported the abolition of religious oaths
or Irish disestablishment without embracing equal protection, even when he
did embrace it he took ambivalent positions on other issues. From this we may
draw the broad but tentative conclusion that for Gladstone consistently to
have defended a political order characterized by religious freedom and equal
protection, he would have needed to accept a wider array of philosophical
views. In other words, he would have been required to modify the institutional
side of his spiritual anthropology and to change his historical conception of
the English community. If this is the case it again suggests that Murphy and
Gray are mistaken to hold that value pluralism plus practical judgments in a
modus vivendi situation will produce a full set of freedoms.
David J. Lorenzo JAMESTOWN COLLEGE
Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
